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Abstract 
 
In a recently published guideline for evaluative reporting in forensic science, the European 
Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) recommended the use of the likelihood ratio 
for the measurement of the value of forensic results. As a device to communicate the 
probative value of the results, the ENFSI guideline mentions the possibility to define and use 
a verbal scale, which should be unified within a forensic institution. This paper summarizes 
discussions held between scientists of our institution to develop and implement such a verbal 
scale. It intends to contribute to general discussions likely to be faced by any forensic 
institution that engages in continuous monitoring and improving of their evaluation and 
reporting format. We first present published arguments in favour of the use of such verbal 
qualifiers. We emphasize that verbal qualifiers do not replace the use of numbers to evaluate 
forensic findings, but are useful to communicate the probative value, since the weight of 
evidence in terms of likelihood ratio are still apprehended with difficulty by both the forensic 
scientists, especially in absence of hard data, and the recipient of information. We further 
present arguments that support the development of the verbal scale we propose. 
Recognising the limits of the use of such a verbal scale, we then discuss its disadvantages: it 
may lead to the spurious view according to which the value of the observations made in a 
given case is relative to other cases. Verbal qualifiers are also prone to misunderstandings 
and cannot be coherently combined with other evidence. We therefore recommend not using 
the verbal qualifier alone in a written statement. While scientists should only report on the 
probability of the findings – and not on the probability of the propositions, which are the duty 
of the Court – we suggest showing examples to let the recipient of information understand 
how the scientific evidence affects the probabilities of the propositions. To avoid 
misunderstandings, we also advise to mention in the statement what the results do not 
mean. Finally, we are of the opinion that if experts were able to coherently articulate 
numbers, and if recipients of information could properly handle such numbers, then verbal 
qualifiers could be abandoned completely. At that time, numerical expressions of probative 
value will be appropriately understood, as other numerical measures that most of us 
understand without the need of any further explanation, such as expressions for length or 
temperature. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In a recently published guideline for evaluative reporting1 in forensic science, the European 
Network of Forensic Science Institutes [2] recommended the use of the likelihood ratio for the 
measurement of the value of forensic results2. The document specifies a series of principles 
to guide the scientist’s thinking about the evaluation of forensic results: the first principle is 
that interpretation takes place in a framework of circumstances and that the value of forensic 
observations depends on relevant case information. In other words, if the case information 
changes, the interpretation of the findings must be reviewed as well. The second principle 
states that the forensic observations shall be interpreted in the light of at least one pair of 
competing propositions. The third principle stresses that it is appropriate for the scientist only 
to address the probability of the observations given the propositions, and not the probability 
of the propositions themselves [3,4,5]. 
 
The application of these principles ensures that the approach is balanced and logical. In 
particular, with the value of the likelihood ratio, scientists express an opinion on the 
observations they have made and they convey the degree of support provided by these 
results for one proposition over the alternative. The recipients of expert information (e.g., the 
Court) can then use this information to update their belief on the competing propositions, 
considering all the other elements of the case. 
 
Although the approach is well structured, its practical implementation represents a challenge 
to both individual scientists and forensic science institutions as a whole. The introduction of 
such a change in evaluation and reporting practice does not happen overnight and requires 
an institutional strategy over a period of time3. 
 
As a device to support scientists’ reporting practice, the ENFSI guideline mentions the 
possibility to define and use standardised verbal qualifiers for ranges of likelihood ratio 
values — also often referred to as a ‘verbal scale’. There is no binding recommendation in 
the ENFSI guideline, but it is advised to use a single and unified reporting convention for all 
disciplines within a forensic institution. It must be emphasised that a verbal scale is not a 
replacement for the likelihood ratio value, but it can represent a convenient way to 
communicate this value. 
 
This article reports on this particular aspect of forensic science reporting. Specifically, we will 
focus on questions and discussions that emerged from works towards the development and 
implementation of optional verbal qualifiers for probative value. This paper — organised in a 
question-answer format — intends to contribute to general discussions likely to be faced by 
any forensic institution that engages in continuous monitoring and improving of their 
evaluation and reporting format. We hope that our readers will see merit in this initiative, as 
we believe that sharing practical experience from different institutions regarding challenges, 
approaches and strategies for implementing the principles emphasized in the ENFSI 
guideline is essential. 																																																								
1 Please note that our discussions will neither include investigative nor technical reporting as defined in both the 
statement of the Association of Forensic Science Providers [1] and the recent ENFSI Guideline [2]. 
 
2 A likelihood ratio is a ratio of two probabilities: the probability of the observations given that the first proposition 
and the conditioning information are true, divided by the probability of the observations given that the alternative 
proposition and the conditioning information are true. 
 
3 For this purpose, the ENFSI guideline proposes a general four step roadmap to help quality managers and 
leading scientists design an implementation plan that is flexible enough to be adapted to service specific 
requirements and needs. 
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2. Discussion of key questions 
 
In the following sections, we describe the key elements raised in the discussions held within 
our institution. As it appears that verbal scales to communicate the weight of evidence are 
quite commonly used in the forensic community, we highlight in section 2.1 the arguments in 
favour of such a practice. We then address, in section 2.2, the question of whether such a 
verbal scale remains useful in the current state of practice. As it emerges that a verbal scale 
may still be of help today, section 2.3 discusses the question of what type of verbal scale 
should be used. Section 2.4 covers misunderstandings that occur when expert opinion is 
only conveyed by words. To overcome these problems, one possible solution could be to add 
the full range of the verbal scale in the statement. Section 2.5 provides arguments against 
this suggestion. Finally, section 2.6 proposes some recommendations that can help 
communicating the value of evidence. 
 
2.1. What are the published arguments in favour of the use of a verbal scale as 
suggested in the ENFSI guideline for evaluative reporting in forensic science? 
 
Harmonisation of conclusions and the use of common terminology is an important aspect in 
forensic science reporting. As early as 1979, Kind et al. [6] suggested conventions regarding 
categorisation of “samples” submitted to forensic science laboratories for examination. In 
1986, Brown and Cropp [7] discussed the importance of avoiding some terms in reports and 
even went a step further by suggesting harmonisation of conclusions using a 
correspondence table between probabilities and adverbs. A year later, Leung and Cheung [8] 
commented on the wide range of terminologies used to define qualified opinions, and 
proposed a way to provide uniformity in this respect. One can see therefore that 
standardisation of qualitative terms to report the opinion of forensic scientists regarding the 
value of evidence has been a preoccupation for forensic scientists for a long time. 
 
Authors focused on the choice of terms used to conclude and tried to find appropriate words 
to convey the value of the evidence in a case, but to our knowledge it was Evett [9] who first 
suggested adopting a verbal scale in forensic science in 1987, based on Jeffreys’s book 
‘Theory of Probability’, first published in 1939. We summarize hereafter arguments presented 
in favour of the use of a verbal scale. 
 
Early arguments in favour of the use of a so-called ‘verbal scale’ are that it should promote 
logical reporting. Indeed, according to Evett [9], verbal qualifiers can help scientists express 
themselves on the value of the results given the propositions rather than on propositions 
themselves. By saying “the results [strongly] support defence proposition rather than 
prosecution proposition”, scientists ensure that they do not transpose the conditional. The 
forensic observations are thus evaluated in agreement with a logical approach, and the 
scientist’s statement of the value of the observations serves the purpose to assist the 
recipient of expert information going from prior to posterior odds [3].  
 
A further argument in favour of the use of verbal equivalents is that in fields where structured, 
documented and published data are scarce, reporting a likelihood ratio may be a challenge. 
Indeed, some scientists feel that they can only commit themselves to particular numbers if 
they can trace them back to calculations based on hard numerical data [10,11]. Also it may 
give the illusion of a level of mathematical precision, whereas no calculation was carried out 
per se, but only an assignment based on experience and training. Instead, in those 
situations, scientists are generally more at ease by communicating the magnitude of their 
likelihood ratio with a verbal equivalent. For example, Jackson [10] wrote that “the scientist 
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should evaluate broadly the magnitude for the likelihood ratio and translate that into a verbal 
equivalent” (p.85). 
 
Verbal conventions also cover an important third function, as one assumes that it helps 
communication between scientists and non-scientists. Indeed, faced with uncertainty, it is 
known that generally people prefer words to numbers [12] so that the use of verbal 
equivalents is considered to be beneficial for the recipients of expert information who “not 
feel confident in handling numbers and react negatively to mathematical formulae” (p.447) 
[13]. 
 
For the above reasons, it would seem convenient for scientists to use a verbal equivalent in 
their statement, instead of reporting the (numerical) value of the likelihood ratio alone: this 
verbal term would then express the value of the observations as given by the likelihood ratio. 
But, as we will see in the next sections, such a device for supporting reporting has some 
disadvantages that one needs to consider. 
 
2.2. Do we need verbal equivalents in the current state of practice? 
 
One negative aspect of verbal qualifiers is that scientists may fail to remember that “the 
assessment comes first, the decision about a verbal qualifier comes later” (p.47) [14]. Ideally, 
as discussed by Berger et al. [14], the assignment of a numerical value, that is a probability 
(or probability density), is “preferable whenever possible” (p.47). It is true that likelihood 
ratios can be assigned qualitatively, but experts need to express themselves in numerical 
terms as it is through numbers that we measure things, convey information and combine it 
with other information [12]. Without numbers, one cannot combine different types of traces if 
needed. One cannot really appreciate either the impact of the additional information on how 
the recipient of information evaluates both propositions. Moreover, numbers allow us to make 
distinctions that words cannot make: indeed, the range of practical situations that ask us to 
make and convey distinctions is so large that we virtually run out of words especially with 
very high likelihood ratios. So, only numbers can cope with this challenge. Numbers also 
offer the advantage of ensuring that when different experts use the same agreed term, they 
intend to convey the same message. The choice can be left to the expert to communicate a 
verbal equivalent instead of a number alone (or an order of magnitude of this number), but it 
would be wrong to say that numbers are not essential to this approach. This misconceives 
the intricacy of practical needs and the measurement problem in the first place (i.e., the 
measurement of uncertainty). 
 
In some areas of forensic science, sufficient data and agreed models are available for 
actually calculating or computing a likelihood ratio. This is the case for DNA profiling, for 
example [15]. Berger et al. [14] also contend that “[i]n those cases where a quantitative 
likelihood ratio has been calculated, (…) it is the number alone that should be put to the jury” 
(p.47). 
 
Probability elicitation when there are no data but essentially expert knowledge (for example 
in the disciplines involving pattern analysis) can be more difficult. There is much effort still to 
be made in training of experts in the assignment of probabilities in casework. As Stoney [16] 
put it more than 30 years ago, “[e]ven if there is general agreement that the likelihood ratio is 
the appropriate method to evaluate physical evidence, this does not solve the question of 
which probabilities are appropriate to use in the ratio itself” (p. 480). However, even if these 
probabilities can legitimately be informed by experience, “it will be necessary for the 
practitioner to be able to demonstrate which experiences provide basis for those 
probabilities” (p. 213) [17]. Assigning a number to express the value of the observations has 
the advantage to force scientists to elicit their thinking process. They will necessarily spend 
more time to interpret their findings and will consequently be more prepared for court 
hearings. It goes without saying that the basis for such a number (or its order of magnitude) 
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shall be explained in the written statement so to be fully transparent, as one would if only 
giving a verbal term.  
 
Suppose that an expert is able to coherently articulate a number, even if this is based on 
documented knowledge and experience rather than on ‘hard’ data. Suppose also that 
communication was improved to the point that recipients of expert information were able to 
properly use the number conveyed by the expert within the framework of a logical approach. 
Would we then still need verbal qualifiers? From a logical point of view, the answer is no. To 
illustrate this, think of widely known systems of measurement such as weight and length. 
Most people are acquainted with expressions such as ‘1 kilogram’ of something (e.g., rice) or 
‘1 meter’ (e.g., for the length of a table). We understand such quantifications because we are 
literate with the measured concepts and the units of measurement. The same could be 
expected if people were perfectly acquainted with matters concerning the measurement of 
uncertainty using probability. Indeed, it is rather surprising to observe the limited capacity of 
people for such an important concept (i.e., probability) to capture an essential feature of life 
(i.e., uncertainty). By extension, we should also be able to expect that the notion of likelihood 
ratio as a measure of probative strength would benefit from such improved understanding. 
 
However, as long as this is not the case, it appears useful or maybe simply reassuring to 
maintain verbal qualifiers to help - along with other strategies - with the communication of 
expert opinions. Furthermore, as suggested by Evett [18], harmonisation regarding verbal 
qualifiers aims at reducing problems of effective communication with mandating parties. It 
promotes exchange between forensic scientists of different disciplines as shown in the next 
section, where we present elements of the discussions that took place between scientists of 
our institution to address some of the challenges encountered when implementing a verbal 
scale. 
 
2.3. Which type of scale should be used? 
 
As underlined by the third principle of interpretation, the conclusions of our evaluative reports 
must refer to the probability of the observations given the propositions and the case 
information, and not to the probability of the propositions. We do not consider verbal 
equivalents based on probabilities of the propositions themselves to be appropriate, because 
assessment of the probability of the propositions falls within the competence of the Court. 
 
Verbal equivalents based on probabilities of the propositions abound in literature. Examples 
can be found in [19,20] and in the “Standard terminology for expressing conclusions of 
forensic document examiners” [21], cited in the 2009 report of the National Research Council 
(p.166) [22]. Critiques of such proposals based on what is named posterior probabilities are 
given in [11,14,18,23-28]. As long as prior odds for the propositions are not specified, such 
scales, which are currently in use in some laboratories, amounts to a common fallacy known 
as transposing the conditional [29,30]. This is not the case for the scales proposed for 
example by Köller et al. [20] and the ENFSI Expert Working Group (EWG) Marks Conclusion 
Scale Committee [31], where equal prior odds are explicitly specified and adopted. However, 
again, we believe that prior odds should be specified by the Court, not by the experts [32]. 
Indeed, equal prior odds that are not based on the case at hand can lead to a result - that is 
posterior probabilities - that does not reflect the belief of the Court (or other recipients of 
expert information) [27,33]. It has been shown that the relevant figure for updating belief is 
the likelihood ratio (LR), not a posterior probability. However to help communicating the 
impact of the LR in a given case, we will suggest later to present various scenarios (see 
appendix C) among them the situation where prior probabilities are equal. Our objection to 
the approach by Köller et al. [20] and the ENFSI EWG Marks Conclusion Scale Committee 
[31] is not on the logical principles underpinning the calculation but on the choice to adopt, on 
behalf of the fact-finder, only one possibility for the prior probabilities.  
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It is for these reasons that the verbal expressions we consider relevant are focused on 
forensic observations and are related to likelihood ratio values, such as those in use in the 
former Forensic Science Service [4,18,34-36) or the Swedish National Forensic Centre [37], 
mentioned as an example also in the ENFSI guideline [2]. All these verbal scales are based 
on a convention and in essence there are no scales that are better than others [38]. What is 
important however is that all disciplines within a laboratory report the value of their 
observations using the same convention. 
 
Theoretically, likelihood ratios range from 0 to infinity, but depending on the discipline or 
even the type of analysis, one may report different order of magnitudes: for example when 
performing DNA autosomal analysis, one can report likelihood ratios as large as a billion 
while with non autosomal (YSTR or mtDNA), likelihood ratios are generally much smaller. 
For micro-traces (such as glass, fibres or paint), LRs are also rarely larger than 10’000, but 
this may not be the case for other disciplines. As there are not an infinite number of verbal 
qualifiers, one has to choose how to slice the full range of reported LRs to construct a verbal 
scale. The ranges and the number of levels chosen should satisfy the needs of all reporting 
scientists in a given institution whatever the discipline. We therefore decided to propose a 
verbal scale similar to that of Evett et al. [4] using the following orders of magnitude: 1, 10, 
100, 1000 and 10’000 and more. At the upper scale, because it is difficult to express very 
large LRs with words, the same word will describe different orders of magnitude (e.g., 10’000 
and one billion). The difficulty of expressing large numbers with words is quite general, for 
example very rich people are described as billionaires or millionaires depending on their 
fortune. One does not really need to add that a billionaire is a very rich person, this is 
conveyed by the number itself, and this is why this number (or order of magnitude) should 
appear in the statement. The conventional scale we propose is illustrated in Appendix A. It is 
based on likelihood ratios and suitable for all disciplines.  
 
2.4. Is the value of evidence properly conveyed if we use words only? 
 
Implementing a unified verbal scale in an institution such as ours raises the question of 
whether the one we propose has the potential to improve communication between scientists 
and lay people and whether the recipient of information understands the results as intended. 
In reviewing the literature we found that even if it is widely considered that verbal terms 
based on the likelihood ratio are “the most appropriate basis for communication of an 
evaluative expert opinion to the court” (p.1) [39], there is empirical evidence for discrepancies 
between intentions in experts’ conclusions and understanding drawn from such conclusions 
by recipients of expert information [40]. 
 
In the previous section we highlighted the importance of proposing a verbal scale on the 
evidence instead of one on the propositions. However, in the experiment reported by Sjerps 
and Biesheuvel [41], different verbal scales were presented to lawyers to study their 
preferences and assess their perception of probative value. Results showed that none of the 
lawyers detected the illogicality of one of the proposed scales that was based on propositions 
themselves. It is, thus, important to alert the recipient of information that to assess posterior 
odds (or the posterior probabilities of propositions) one needs to be given their prior odds (or 
prior probabilities of propositions). 
 
Various research concentrated on how the strength of different verbal equivalents is 
perceived among people and on how this corresponds with the expert’ results. Nordgaard et 
al. [42] noted that people tend to have their own interpretation of the verbal terms used by 
experts to communicate probative strength. It appears that the meaning of a single word 
depends on the context [43,44] and in particular on the evidence type, as some forensic 
types are expected to provide stronger evidence than others [45]. In our internal discussions 
on this topic, we have noted that it is sometimes disturbing to see that people think that 
likelihood ratios are relative in aspects that are not relative. For example, a LR of a 1000 in 
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glass expresses the same value (of probative strength) as a LR of 1000 in DNA. Therefore, 
one cannot say that a LR of 1000 is strong in glass and of limited value for autosomal DNA. 
And, on the other hand, people also sometimes think of LRs being absolute in aspects that 
are relative. For example, our LRs depend strongly on the propositions and on the case 
information. 
 
The studies of Brun and Teigen [46] and Shaw and Dear [47] highlighted large differences 
between people in the attribution of a numerical equivalent to the same verbal expression. 
This result was confirmed by Martire et al. [44] who found a poor correspondence between 
verbal and numerical equivalents concerning the scale proposed by the Association of 
Forensic Science Providers (AFSP). This was also observed by McQuiston-Surrett and Saks 
[48] who examined undergraduate psychology students’ ratings of the strength of the terms 
proposed by the American Board of Forensic Odontology (ABFO). They found that the 
responses from students were completely opposite to what the ABFO intended. 
 
More recently, Martire and Watkins [40] intended to re-examine the results of the pilot study 
of Mullen et al. [45]. As in previous studies, the authors found that the verbal scale does not 
achieve its primary aim of facilitating communication between experts and lay people, 
because the perceived value of the forensic findings by lay people did not correspond to the 
intended value assigned to the evidence by experts. The authors analysed the 
correspondence between lay people interpretation of verbal qualifiers and ranges of LRs 
intended by the expert. According to their results, none of the ranges of LRs chosen by the 
experts corresponded with lay people perception of the strength of the evidence when 
presented with a verbal equivalent, except for “limited” or “weak support”. However, even in 
those cases, Martire et al. [44] reported that the intentions of the expert could be 
misunderstood. The authors called this the “weak evidence effect”, that is the risk of wrongly 
concluding that the evidence rather strongly supports the alternative proposition, in cases 
where the observations provide weak (or limited) support in favour of a given proposition 
over the alternative. 
 
In order to improve the communication between experts and laypeople the next sections will 
be focusing on some solutions that could possibly overcome the above-mentioned 
difficulties. 
 
2.5. Is there merit in providing the full range of the verbal scale (with or without levels) 
in the written statement? 
 
It has been suggested in the literature that to help understand verbal expressions of 
probative strength, there would be merit in mentioning, in the scientist’s written statement, all 
verbal expressions agreed and used by the expert’s laboratory. This would enable the reader 
to see whether the case at hand should be considered ‘a strong case’, or on the contrary, a 
case where the evidence is of limited value. This view is recommended, for example, by the 
AFSP statement [1], which requires that the full range of verbal expressions be provided in 
the expert’s report. A position that is also supported by Jackson et al. [49]. If, as a first step to 
help implementation of the approach, one decides not to express the likelihood ratio in terms 
of numbers, then we see advantages in providing the whole scale in the written statement. 
However, we argue that mentioning the full range of verbal expressions comes with some 
costs and appears to be of limited value for harmonising the way in which the strength of 
evidence is understood. Indeed, in the study of Sjerps and Biesheuvel [41], the value of the 
observations was perceived differently among different persons, even when the various 
verbal terms were fully disclosed to participants. A further issue is that stating the full range 
of verbal qualifiers may suggest that a likelihood ratio falling in the top level of the range is 
more ‘useful’ for the fact-finder than a likelihood ratio from a lower level. This conveys the 
misleading impression that the LR obtained in the given case is relative to other cases one 
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could possibly have. For these reasons, we do not recommend to provide the full range of 
verbal qualifiers in the written statement. 
 
A topic related to the above is the use of the log-likelihood ratio (log(LR)) [23,50,51]. As early 
as 1950, Good [50] referred to the log(LR) as the weight of evidence, because it has several 
desirable properties that a measure of information ought to have. Most prominently known is 
the additive property, that is the joint value of several probabilistically independent items of 
evidence is given by the sum of the weights (i.e., log-likelihood ratios) attached to each item 
of evidence. Furthermore, one can sum the weight of evidence with the logarithm of the prior 
odds to obtain the logarithm of the posterior odds. This has the advantage of keeping the 
intuitive image of weighing evidence in the scales of justice: when the weight is 0 the 
evidence provides no support and the scales of justice remain unchanged; when the weight 
is positive it provides support for the first proposition and when it is negative it provides 
support for the alternative. Finally, using the log(LR) helps understand the magnitude of large 
likelihood ratio values. Different commonly used scales refer to logarithms for such reasons: 
the Richter scale for earthquakes, decibels for sound, pH for acidity. 
 
In our scale, however, we decided not to indicate the log(LR) because the use of numbers 
such as +1, +2 etc. to indicate the log(LR) associated to the verbal qualifiers might lead one 
to think that a +1 is not useful, and that one needs greater tags, such as +5, in order to have 
powerful evidence. This, again, provides the inappropriate impression that the likelihood ratio 
in the given case is relative to other possible cases. However, recipients of expert 
information are (or should be) exclusively concerned by the likelihood ratio obtained in their 
case at hand. They will consider their case as a whole and ideally combine their prior beliefs 
about the case with the value provided by scientific observations. For example, if their prior 
odds for the main proposition in the case are high, then even a small likelihood ratio might be 
useful in the sense of being sufficient to discriminate between the propositions of interest and 
thus help with the case issue. On other occasions, even a large likelihood ratio may not be 
helpful enough because prior odds are very low.  
 
We concede that the wording used for verbal qualifiers may also lead to the same 
perception. A value of observations qualified as providing ‘weak (or limited) support’ for a 
given proposition over the other may suggest that the evidence is quite useless. However, it 
may be very helpful for the Court, depending on their prior odds. In our next section, we 
discuss ways to tackle this challenge. 
 
 
2.6. What options can we explore to improve communication? 
 
In the previous paragraphs, we have seen that one disadvantage of verbal qualifiers is that 
they may lead to the spurious view according to which the value of the observations made in 
a given case is relative to other cases. Verbal qualifiers are also prone to misunderstandings 
and cannot be coherently combined with other evidence. For these reasons, we should not 
report the associated verbal qualifier alone: one can either give one's LR and the verbal 
qualifier or just give the LR alone. Reporting only a numerical value would seem to be the 
best option as numbers can be logically combined [12,23]. However, we have also seen that 
people generally tend to be poorly acquainted with matters concerning the measurement of 
uncertainty using probability. Before key players are fully accustomed to likelihood ratios as a 
measure of the value of evidence, communication needs to be improved. Hereafter we 
suggest a few avenues. These are of course non prescriptive and the best option may 
depend on personal preference of either the scientist or the recipient of information or even 
on the case. 
 
Because recipients of information are in fine interested in posterior probabilities, we suggest 
showing the impact of the value of evidence on the probability of the propositions. Therefore, 
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we suggest to illustrate this impact with a table where one takes several prior probabilities (or 
odds), and then provide the corresponding values of posterior probabilities (or odds) given 
the LR obtained in the case. 
 
For illustration purposes, we have taken a case with a likelihood ratio in the order of ten. In 
such a case, we would qualify the value of the observations as weak or limited. Indeed, as 
mentioned earlier, this type of value has been shown to be inappropriately conveyed by the 
use of verbal equivalents alone. To avoid the problem that laypersons believe that limited 
support for one proposition means, for example, strong support for the alternative proposition 
(also referred to the weak evidence effect [44]), we prefer to formulate the conclusion in two 
steps. First, the forensic scientists could state that the observations support a given 
proposition over the other. Then, in a second sentence, they would qualify this support as 
limited or weak. Moreover, we emphasise that it is crucial to always mention both 
propositions in our conclusions, and not only one as the value of the results depends 
intimately on the propositions at hand. This procedure has the advantage of underlining that 
the value of the results obtained is not absolute, but relative to the propositions of interest. 
An example of such a conclusion is provided in Appendix B. In Appendix C, Tables 2 and 3 
show the impact of the likelihood ratio obtained on posterior odds (and posterior probabilities 
of defence proposition), taking three examples of prior odds (and prior probabilities of 
defence proposition). 
 
As we have shown before, scientists must report their conclusions based on the probability of 
the observations given the propositions. However, the recipient of information may 
misunderstand this conclusion as an opinion on the propositions themselves. This is the 
above-mentioned well-known error called transposing the conditional. In order to avoid such 
a fallacy, one can indicate in the statement not only what the results mean but also what they 
do not mean. An example is given in appendix D. In particular, if the statement must be 
translated, such a word of caution may be helpful in order to ensure that the translator does 
not transpose the conditional either. 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
The findings of the studies of Sjerps and Biesheuvel [41], Mullen et al. [45] and Martire and 
Watkins [40] show that it is not sufficient to develop only appropriate terminology for verbal 
terms. Improvement of education in this area is also essential. The focus should be on 
explaining in detail the experts’ logic of reasoning, and the way in which it contributes to 
reasoning at trial in general. It appears less promising to concentrate on the likelihood ratio 
alone, since it is not well understood in isolation, in whatever way it is communicated, that is 
a number, a verbal equivalent or even visually [44]. 
 
This avenue, as well as other initiatives such teaching, conferences, articles, continuing 
education [52], research and discussions between scientists and the recipients of information 
need to be pursued in order to improve communication and mutual understanding. A verbal 
equivalent alone cannot achieve the difficult task of helping the Court fully grasp the concept 
of probability and likelihood ratios. 
 
Verbal qualifiers for probative strength, in whatever way they are agreed and practiced within 
the forensic community, or within a forensic institution, merely represent a consensus. 
However, they are widely found to be unsatisfactory, both for the general audience (since no 
standardisation is possible regarding the individual understanding of verbal equivalents) and 
scientists. Indeed, there does not seem to be a single right word that would express a given 
aspect of expert opinion. For example, Martire et al. [44] have pointed out that the verbal 
conventions proposed by the AFSP are far from ideal. 
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A fundamental question that follows is whether verbal equivalents could be abandoned 
completely if (i) experts were able to coherently articulate numbers, including situations in 
which they are based on experience and scarce ‘hard’ data, and (ii) recipients of expert 
information would be able to properly handle such numbers. An immediate answer would be 
‘yes’, however numerical expressions of probative value are usually not appropriately 
understood - contrarily to other numerical measures that most of us understand without the 
need of any further explanation (e.g., expressions for length, temperature, etc.). A more 
widespread understanding of the likelihood ratio as the measure of probative value thus 
appears desirable, but as long as this is not the case, we consider it necessary to follow the 
current ENFSI guideline and rely on both the numerical likelihood ratio and the option of 
verbal qualifiers, where deemed useful, for evaluative reporting in forensic science. 
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APPENDICES 
 
A. Proposed verbal scale 
 
A likelihood ratio in excess of one represents support for the prosecution proposition. A 
likelihood ratio less than one represents support for the defence proposition. It cannot 
support both propositions, but it can support neither, when the likelihood ratio is equal to one. 
Indeed, if the results are just as probable given the truth of either proposition, they do not 
help to advance the issue. 
 
However, as LRs below one are difficult to understand, we found it beneficial to inverse the 
propositions if the support is in favour of the defence. Therefore, instead of reporting that – 
given the information available – the results are 0.1 times more probable given the 
prosecution proposition than given the defence proposition, we will write that – given the 
information available – the results are 10 times more probable given the defence proposition 
than given the prosecution proposition. 
 
VERBAL COMMUNICATION LR 
The results support the proposition that... rather than the proposition that…  
This support is qualified as extremely strong.  
> 10’000 
The results support the proposition that... rather than the proposition that... 
This support is qualified as very strong.  
>1000 – 10’000 
The results support the proposition that... rather than the proposition that... 
This support is qualified as strong. 
>100 – 1000 
The results support the proposition that... rather than the proposition that... 
This support is qualified as moderate.  
>10 – 100 
The results support the proposition that... rather than the proposition that... 
This support is qualified as weak or limited. 
>1 – 10 
The results support neither propositions. 
This support is qualified as null. 
1 
Table 1: Proposed verbal scale for reporting the value of the scientific observations (translated from 
French). 
 
B. Example of how to formulate a conclusion when our LRs are in the order of 10 (i.e., 
defined as weak evidence). 
 
It has been shown in the literature [44] and in practice that verbal qualifiers chosen to convey 
small LRs are not well understood. It is hoped that by reporting in two phases, the value of 
the observations will be communicated more efficiently. We have taken a real case where 
the propositions were: 
- Mr Jones signed the contested document (prosecution proposition); 
- An unknown person signed the contested document (defence proposition). 
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As our LR was in the order of 0.1, we would reverse the propositions and report as follows: 
The results provide support for the proposition that an unknown person – rather than Mr 
Jones – signed the contested document. This support is qualified as weak or limited, as the 
results are in the order of 10 times more probable given that the proposition that an unknown 
person signed the contested document is true, rather than given that the alternative is true 
(i.e., Mr Jones signed the contested document). 
C. Example of how one can show the impact of the value of the observations in the 
case at hand  
 
The relevant figure for updating belief is the likelihood ratio, not a posterior probability. 
However, how the Court is to use the information provided by the forensic examinations and 
combine it with the other elements of the case is a challenge. There are certainly several 
ways to deal with this aspect, but one possible solution could be to present, in the form of an 
appendix to the statement, the impact of the LR obtained in the case at hand on posterior 
odds, based on different prior odds. Here is an example taking again the previous signature 
case (with a likelihood ratio of 10 in favour of defence proposition). 
 
The impact of the value of the observations made on the signatures on the probability of a 
proposition is illustrated in Table 3. In order to obtain the posterior probability (considering 
the information provided in the case and the forensic observations) that an unknown person 
has signed the document rather than Mr Jones, one has to combine the likelihood ratio (i.e., 
the value of the observations provided by the document examiner) with prior odds 
(considering all other relevant element in the case but the forensic observations) that an 
unknown person has signed the document rather than Mr Jones. These prior odds – or 
respectively one’s prior probability – represent the opinion that the Court may have on the 
probability that an unknown person (and respectively the probability that Mr Jones) signed 
the document based on the other elements of the case, before being exposed to the results 
of the forensic document examination. The posterior probability represents the opinion that 
the Court would have on the proposition that an unknown person signed the document based 
on the other elements of the case and on the findings obtained by the forensic document 
examiner. 
 
 
 
Prior odds for defence 
proposition compared to 
prosecution 
LR Posterior odds for defence 
proposition compared to 
prosecution 
Example 1 1 to 9 10  10 to 9 
Example 2 1 to 1 10  10 to 1 
Example 3 9 to 1 10  90 to 1 
Table 2: Examples of posterior odds obtained by multiplication of prior odds by our likelihood ratio. 
Using odds, one can easily see that – with a LR of 10 – posterior odds are ten times larger than prior 
odds. 
 
 
Persons who would rather use probabilities than odds can refer to Table 3. 
 
Prior probability for 
defence proposition 
LR Posterior probability for 
defence proposition  
Example 1 0.1  10  0.5  
Example 2 0.5  10  0.9  
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Example 3 0.9 10  0.99 
Table 3: Examples of posterior probabilities considering different prior odds and a likelihood ratio of 
10. To obtain our posterior probabilities, we used the odds form of Bayes formula and calculated the 
corresponding probabilities [3]. 
 
One can see that the posterior probability depends not only on the observations made in the 
context of the forensic examination but also on the value that the Court’s prior probability 
may take (which depends on the other elements of the case). 
 
Three cases are illustrated, but on demand it is possible to consider more: 
- The first case illustrates the situation where the balance of prior probabilities favours 
the proposition that Mr Jones signed the document (with a probability of 0.9) rather 
than some unknown person (who would have signed with a probability of 0.1). On 
one hand, one can see that after the information provided by the signature 
examination, the probability that some unknown person signed goes from 0.1 to 0.5. 
In that case after considering the findings, it is equally probable that Mr Jones has 
signed rather than an unknown person. 
- The second case illustrates the situation where the balance of prior probabilities 
favours neither proposition (both are a priori equally probable). One can see that after 
knowing the results of the forensic examination, the posterior probability that some 
unknown person signed goes from 0.5 to 0.9. On the other hand, the posterior 
probability that Mr Jones signed the document goes from 0.5 to 0.1. 
- The third case illustrates the situation where the balance of prior probabilities favours 
the proposition that an unknown person signed the document (with a probability of 
0.9) rather than Mr Jones (who would have signed with a probability of 0.1). After 
considering the information given by the examination of the signatures, the posterior 
probability that some unknown person signed the contested document goes from 0.9 
to 0.99. On the other hand, the posterior probability that Mr Jones signed the 
document goes from 0.1 to 0.01. 
 
D. Note of caution regarding transposing the conditional  
 
As recipients of information are interested in the probability of the propositions, conclusions 
such as “The results strongly support the prosecution proposition rather than the defence 
proposition” are often read (or translated) as “Prosecution proposition is highly probable”. To 
avoid such a misunderstanding, one can put a cautionary note in the statement that can take 
the following form:  
Note of caution: Our results do not mean that it is probably an unknown person who signed 
the document. Indeed, the probability that it is an unknown person (rather than Mr Jones) 
who signed the contested document depends not only on the observations made on the 
signatures, but also on other elements (enquiry, testimony, other information). The evaluation 
of these other elements are of the domain of the Court, and scientists should not give their 
opinion on the truth (or probability) of the propositions, but they should help the trier of facts 
by giving their probability of the observations given each proposition. 
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